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Abstract  Medication  errors  are  the  common  causes  of  patient  morbidity  and  mortality.  It  adds
ﬁnancial  burden  to  the  institution  as  well.  Though  the  impact  varies  from  no  harm  to  serious
adverse effects  including  death,  it  needs  attention  on  priority  basis  since  medication  errors’  are
preventable.  In  today’s  world  where  people  are  aware  and  medical  claims  are  on  the  hike,  it  is
of utmost  priority  that  we  curb  this  issue.  Individual  effort  to  decrease  medication  error  alone
might not  be  successful  until  a  change  in  the  existing  protocols  and  system  is  incorporated.
Often drug  errors  that  occur  cannot  be  reversed.  The  best  way  to  ‘treat’  drug  errors  is  to
prevent them.  Wrong  medication  (due  to  syringe  swap),  overdose  (due  to  misunderstanding  or
preconception  of  the  dose,  pump  misuse  and  dilution  error),  incorrect  administration  route,
under dosing  and  omission  are  common  causes  of  medication  error  that  occur  perioperatively.
Drug omission  and  calculation  mistakes  occur  commonly  in  ICU.  Medication  errors  can  occur
perioperatively  either  during  preparation,  administration  or  record  keeping.  Numerous  human
and system  errors  can  be  blamed  for  occurrence  of  medication  errors.  The  need  of  the  hour  is  to
stop the  blame  --  game,  accept  mistakes  and  develop  a  safe  and  ‘just’  culture  in  order  to  prevent
medication  errors.  The  newly  devised  systems  like  VEINROM,  a  ﬂuid  delivery  system  is  a  novel
approach in  preventing  drug  errors  due  to  most  commonly  used  medications  in  anesthesia.
Similar developments  along  with  vigilant  doctors,  safe  workplace  culture  and  organizational
support  all  together  can  help  prevent  these  errors.lsevier  Editora  Ltda.  on  behalf  of  Sociedade  Brasileira  de
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PALAVRAS-CHAVE
Erros  médicos;
Seguranc¸a do
paciente;
Erros  de
medicamentos;
Melhora  da  qualidade
Erros  de  medicac¸ão  em  anestesia:  inaceitável  ou  inevitável?
Resumo  Os  erros  de  medicac¸ão  são  as  causas  mais  comuns  de  morbidade  e  mortalidade  dos
pacientes.  Além  disso,  esses  erros  aumentam  os  encargos  ﬁnanceiros  da  instituic¸ão.  Embora
o impacto  varie  de  nenhum  dano  a  efeitos  adversos  graves,  incluindo  o  óbito,  é  preciso  estar
atento à  ordem  de  prioridades  porque  os  erros  de  medicac¸ão  são  evitáveis.  Na  atualidade,  com
as pessoas  cientes  e  os  processos  médicos  em  evidência,  frear  esse  problema  é  de  extrema
prioridade.  O  esforc¸o  individual  para  diminuir  os  erros  de  medicac¸ão  pode  não  obter  sucesso
até que  uma  mudanc¸a  nos  protocolos  e  sistemas  existentes  seja  incorporada.  Muitas  vezes,  os
erros de  medicac¸ão  ocorridos  não  podem  ser  revertidos.  A  melhor  maneira  de  ‘‘tratar’’  esses
erros é  impedi-los.  Os  erros  de  medicac¸ão  (devido  à  troca  de  seringa),  de  overdose  (devido
a mal-entendido  ou  preconcepc¸ão  da  dose,  mal  uso  de  bomba  e  erro  de  diluic¸ão),  de  via  de
administrac¸ão incorreta,  de  subdosagem  e  de  omissão  são  causas  comuns  de  erro  de  medicac¸ão
que ocorrem  no  período  perioperatório.  A  omissão  e  erros  no  cálculo  de  medicamentos  ocorrem
comumente  em  UTI.  Os  erros  de  medicac¸ão  podem  ocorrer  no  período  perioperatório,  tanto
durante a  preparac¸ão  e  administrac¸ão  quanto  na  manutenc¸ão  de  registros.  Um  grande  número
de erros  humanos  e  do  sistema  pode  ser  responsabilizado  pela  ocorrência  de  erros  de  medicac¸ão.
A necessidade  do  momento  é  parar  o  jogo  da  culpa,  aceitar  os  erros  e  desenvolver  uma  cultura
segura e  ‘‘justa’’  para  evitar  os  erros  de  medicac¸ão.  Os  sistemas  recém-criados  como  o  VEIN-
ROM, um  sistema  de  administrac¸ão  de  líquidos,  é  uma  nova  abordagem  na  prevenc¸ão  de  erros  de
medicac¸ão devido  aos  medicamentos  mais  comumente  usados  em  anestesia.  Desenvolvimentos
semelhantes,  juntamente  com  médicos  vigilantes,  uma  cultura  de  local  de  trabalho  seguro  e
apoio organizacional,  todos  em  conjunto  podem  ajudar  a  evitar  esses  erros.
© 2016  Publicado  por  Elsevier  Editora  Ltda.  em  nome  da  Sociedade  Brasileira
de Anestesiologia.  Este  é  um  artigo  Open  Access  sob  a  licença  de  CC  BY-NC-ND
(http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nc-nd/4.0/).
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‘To  err  is  human’’
n  anesthesiologist  may  inject  up  to  half  a  million  different
rugs  in  his/her  professional  tenure.  The  chance  of  mak-
ng  an  inadvertent  error  is  easily  fathomable.  Anesthetized
atients  with  unpredictable  physiological  reserves  would  not
isplay  or  verbalize  any  symptoms  that  an  awake  patient
ould,  such  as  hypotension,  bronchospasm,  arrhythmias  or
ardiac  arrest.  Any  such  error  may  cause  irreversible  dam-
ge/s.  When  patients  consent  for  anesthesia,  they  trust  that
ur  training  is  adequate,  judgment  is  uncompromised  and
ompetence  validated.  It  is  this  responsibility  for  which  we
tand  accountable.
Medication  errors  signiﬁcantly  augment  the  ﬁnancial  cost
o  human  tragedy.  Bates  et  al.1 found  that  about  two  out  of
very  100  in-patients  experience  a  preventable  adverse  drug
vent,  resulting  in  an  average  increase  of  hospital  costs  by
4700  per  admission  or  about  $2.8  million  annually  for  a  700
ed  hospital.  Therefore  medical  errors  should  be  priority
s  an  urgent,  critical,  and  widespread  public  health  prob-
em.  Systems  need  to  be  engineered  to  reduce  the  likelihood
f  medication  misidentiﬁcation  through  approaches  such  as
evision  of  standards  for  labeling  of  drug  ampoules  and  vials
nd  the  development  of  advanced  electronic/digital  mech-Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Dhawan  I,  et  al.  Medicatio
Bras  Anestesiol.  2016.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bjane.2015
nisms  that  allow  ‘‘double-checking’’  or  drug  veriﬁcation  in
he  operating  room.2
More  people  die  from  medical  errors  than  motor  vehicle
ccidents,  breast  cancer,  or  HIV,  but  unfortunately  these
d
v
i
btatistics  never  appropriately  ﬁgure  in  public  media  or
eliberations.  A  few  horriﬁc  cases  of  erroneous  drug  admin-
stration  do  make  the  news  headlines,  either  because  they
nvolve  a celebrity  or  due  to  their  egregious  nature.  Unfor-
unately,  they  constitute  only  the  tip  of  the  iceberg.  The
bjective  of  this  review  is  to  discuss  safety  while  adminis-
ering  drugs  to  patients  under  anesthesia.
ncidence
ith  an  aim  to  establish  the  frequency  and  nature  of  drug
dministration  in  anesthesia,  Webster  et  al.3 performed  a
tudy  based  on  7794  anesthesiologist  responses  from  two
ospitals.  They  documented  that  the  frequency  of  drug
dministration  error  (of  any  type)  per  anesthetic  case  was
.0075  (0.75%  or  1  per  133  anesthetics)  with  the  two  largest
ategories  of  errors  involving  incorrect  doses  (20%)  and
ubstitutions  (20%),  hence  concluding  that  ADE  (adverse
rug  effects)  during  anesthesia  is  considerably  more  fre-
uent  than  previously  reported.
Sakaguchi  et  al.4 studied  the  incidence  of  anesthesia
elated  medication  errors  in  a  university  hospital  in  Japan
ver  15  years  and  based  on  64,285  anesthesia  cases  con-
luded  that  drug  errors  occurred  in  only  50  cases  (0.078%),
uch  lower  from  earlier  reported  incidence.  The  reported
rugs  were  most  commonly  opioids,  cardiac  stimulants  andn  errors  in  anesthesia:  unacceptable  or  unavoidable?  Rev
.09.006
asopressors;  syringe  swap  the  leading  cause  of  errors  and
nterestingly,  the  responsible  anesthesiologists  most  likely
eing  doctors  with  little  experience.
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Table  1  Incidence  of  medication  errors  in  key  studies.
Study  Study  period  Number  of  anesthetics
delivered
Incidence  of
drug  error
Percentage  of
drug  error
Webster  et  al.3 Feb  1998--Oct  1999  10,806  81  0.75%
Sakaguchi et  al.4 1993--2007 64,285  50  0.078%
Llewellyn et  al.5 Jul  2005--Jan  2006 30,412  111  0.37%
Cooper et  al.6 Aug  2007--Feb  2008  10,574  52  0.49%
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In  South  Africa,  Llewellyn  et  al.5 reported  an  incidence
of  0.37%  (111  incidences  for  30,412  anesthetics  or  1  per  274)
with  a  conclusion  that  neither  the  experience  of  the  anes-
thetist  nor  the  emergent  nature  of  the  surgery  inﬂuenced
the  incidence  and  nearly  40%  of  all  errors  occurred  due  to
misidentiﬁcation  of  drug  ampoules.  No  major  complication
attributable  to  ADE-adverse  drug  effects  was  reported.
Cooper  et  al.6 reported  a  medication  error  rate  during
anesthesia  of  0.49%  (52  errors  from  10,574  case  forms  or  1
per  203  anesthetics)  and  a  two-fold  increase  in  the  rates  by
anesthesia-in-training  providers  compared  to  experienced
provider,  most  commonly  due  to  incorrect  dose  and  drug
substitution.
Zhang  et  al.,7 in  a  prospective  incident-monitoring  study
in  China  reported  a  medication  error  rate  of  0.73%  (179
errors  during  16,496  anesthetics),  the  largest  category  being
omission,  incorrect  dosage  and  substitutions,  collectively
accounting  for  more  than  65%  of  all  errors.  These  led  to
serious  complications  in  at  least  two  and  inadvertent  ICU
admissions  for  ﬁve  patients.  The  incidence  of  medication
errors  from  the  above  mentioned  studies  have  been  com-
plied  in  Table  1.
When  combining  the  3  prospective  study  ﬁndings  of  Web-
ster  et  al.,3 Llewellyn  et  al.,5 and  Cooper  et  al.,6 244  errors
were  reported  in  51,504  administered  anesthetics.  That
gave  us  a  combined  incidence  of  1  in  211  medication  errors
in  anesthesia  practice.8
Based  on  a  limited  number  of  prospective  studies,
the  estimated  incidence  of  medication  error  in  anesthetic
practice  ranges  from  0.33%  to  0.73%6,7 per  case  and  unfor-
tunately  this  rate  has  not  changed  substantially  over  the  last
15  years.4
The  Critical  Care  Safety  Study  reported  an  overall  rate
of  80.5  medication  errors  associated  with  harm  per  1000
patient-days  in  medical  and  coronary-care  patients.9 In  the
SEE2  study,  the  rate  of  parenteral  medication  errors  was  745
per  1000  patient-days.10
In  a  systematic  review  by  Wilmer  et  al.11 to  assess  inci-
dence  of  drug  events  in  intensive  care  units  (ICUs),  the  rates
of  medication  errors  (MEs)  varied  from  8.1  to  2344  per  1000
patient-days,  and  adverse  drug  events  (ADEs)  from  5.1  to
87.5  per  1000  patient-days.  The  deﬁnitions  of  ADE  and  ME  in
the  studies  varied  widely  which  could  have  been  the  cause
of  this  vast  variation  in  incidence.Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Dhawan  I,  et  al.  Medicatio
Bras  Anestesiol.  2016.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bjane.2015
Historical  perspective  of  medication  errors
Look-alike,  sound-alike  drugs,12,13 confusing,  inaccurate  or
incomplete  drug  labels  and  packaging,13 swapping  of  syringe
s
(
o179  0.73%
abels,14,15 swapping  of  syringes  and  ampoules,4 unlabelled
yringes,16 and  failure  of  drug-dose  calculation,17 have  all
een  reported.
A  system  failure,  that  had  profound  implications  for  anes-
hesia  in  the  United  Kingdom,  was  the  case  of  Woolley
nd  Roe,  in  which  two  patients  were  left  paraplegic  after
ndergoing  spinal  anesthesia  at  Chesterﬁeld  Royal  Hospital
n  1947.18 At  that  time,  their  injuries  were  thought  to  be
ue  to  microscopic  cracks  in  the  local  anesthetic  ampoules,
hrough  which  phenol  seemed  to  have  seeped  during  the
terilization  process.  In  fact,  it  appeared  that  a  batch  of
eusable  spinal  needles  had  not  been  removed  from  a  bath
f  acidic  descaler  and  boiled  in  distilled  water  before  use
ecause  a  member  of  staff  had  called-in  sick,  and  was  off-
uty,19 a  classic  system  failure.  A  fatality  was  reported  when
he  ﬂow  rate  of  a  patient’s  epidural  pump  was  increased  to
25  mL/h  by  a  ‘ward  nurse’  who  had  intended  to  give  an
ntravenous  ﬂuid  bolus,  despite  the  pump  being  correctly
abeled  and  the  patient  receiving  parenteral  ﬂuids  via  a
ravity-fed  drip  set.20
High  proﬁle  cases  of  fatalities  caused  by  accidental
njection  of  intrathecal  vincristine  have  resulted  in  blame,
harges  and  convictions  for  the  individuals  involved  rather
han  recognition  that  they  result  from  system  failures.21
verdose  of  anticoagulants  resulting  in  hemorrhage,  admin-
stration  of  antibiotics  to  patients  with  preexisting  history  of
llergy  to  such  antibiotics,  failure  to  prescribe  prophylaxis
gainst  venous  thromboembolism  and  adverse  drug  events
ith  opioids,  theophylline,  antimicrobials,  anticonvulsants,
nticancer  drugs  and  muscle  relaxants  are  well  known.22--26
rugs  most  commonly  involved  in  serious  errors  were  hep-
rin,  epinephrine,  potassium  chloride  and  lidocaine,  the
ast  being  implicated  in  most  fatalities.27 The  accidental
njection  of  intrathecal  vincristine  rather  than  methotrex-
te  during  chemotherapy  for  acute  lymphoblastic  leukemia
as  devastating  consequences  and  seems  to  have  occurred
ith  depressing  regularity.28
Wrong  medication  was  the  most  common  type  of  drug
rror  (48%)  occurring  perioperatively,  followed  by  overdose
38%),  incorrect  administration  route  (8%),  under  dosing
4%)  and  omission  (2%).  Opioids,  cardiac  stimulants,  and
asopressors  were  the  most  common  culprits.  Forty-two  per-
ent  of  wrong  medication  administration  occurred  following
yringe  swap,  Drug  ampoule  swap  occurred  in  33%,  and  the
rong  choice  of  drug  was  made  in  17%.  The  ﬁrst,  second,  and
hird  most  frequent  causes  of  overdose  involved  a  misunder-n  errors  in  anesthesia:  unacceptable  or  unavoidable?  Rev
.09.006
tanding  or  preconception  of  the  dose  (53%),  pump  misuse
21%),  and  dilution  error  (5%).4
In  the  critical  care  or  high  dependency  units,  errors  most
ften  originated  in  the  administration  phase  (44%)  in  ICU  in
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 study  by  Latif  et  al.29 The  most  common  error  type  was
mission  (26%).  Among  harmful  errors,  dispensing  devices
14%)  and  calculation  mistakes  (9.8%)  were  more  commonly
dentiﬁed  to  be  the  cause  in  the  ICU  compared  to  the  non-ICU
etting.
edico-legal  consequences
edical  errors  can  have  profound  ramiﬁcations  for  patients
nd  families.  Once  the  error  has  reached  the  patient,
he  medical  provider,  patient  and  their  families  are
elpless.  It  adds  signiﬁcant  cost  to  medical  treatment,
ncreases  morbidity  (disability)  and  may  even  lead  to  mor-
ality.  Employers,  consumers  and  taxpayers  are  increasingly
emanding  that  providers  of  medical  care  be  held  more
ccountable,  particularly  as  the  costs  of  health  insurance
ontinue  to  rise.  Several  organizations  have  developed  and
evoted  exclusively  to  enhance  patient  safety.  Hospitals  and
octors  can  end  up  footing  upwards  of  million  dollar  settle-
ents  for  medical  malpractice  cases.
It  is  a  chilling  reality  --  one  often  overlooked  in  annual
ortality  statistics:  Preventable  medical  errors  persist  as
he  n◦ 3  ‘killer’  in  the  U.S.  --  preceded  only  by  heart  disease
nd  cancer  --  claiming  the  lives  of  some  400,000  people  each
ear.30
Ninety-three  claims  (with  a  total  cost  £4,915,450)
led  under  ‘‘anesthesia’’  in  the  NHS  Litigation  Authority
atabase  between  1995  and  2007,  alleging  patient  harm
irectly  by  drug  administration  error  or  by  an  allergic  reac-
ion,  were  analyzed.  Alleged  errors  were  categorized  using
ystems  employed  by  the  National  Coordinating  Council  for
edication  Error  Reporting  and  Prevention,  the  American
ociety  of  Anesthesiologists  Closed  Claims  Project  and  the
K  Health  and  Safety  Executive.  The  severity  of  outcome  in
ach  claim  was  categorized  using  adapted  National  Patient
afety  Agency  deﬁnitions.  Sixty-two  claims  involved  alleged
rug  administration  errors  (total  cost  £4,283,677)  and  15
esulted  in  severe  harm  or  death.  Half  alleged  the  admin-
stration  of  the  wrong  drug,  in  most  (16)  a  neuromuscular
locker.  Of  the  claims  alleging  the  wrong  dose  had  been
iven  (25),  nine  alleged  opioid  overdose  including  by  neurax-
al  routes.  The  most  frequently  recorded  adverse  outcomes
ere  ‘awake-paralysis’  (19  claims;  total  cost  £182,347)
nd  respiratory  depression  requiring  intensive  care  treat-
ent  (13  claims;  total  cost  £2,752,853).  Thirty-one  claims
nvolved  allergic  reactions  (total  cost  631,773  pounds).  In
0  claims,  the  patient  allegedly  received  a  drug  to  which
hey  were  known  to  be  allergic  (total  cost  £130,794).  All
laims  in  which  it  was  possible  to  categorize  the  nature  of
he  error  involved  ‘human  error’.  Fewer  than  half  the  claims
ppeared  likely  to  have  been  preventable  by  an  ‘‘ideal  dou-
le  checking  process’’.31
eﬁnition
any  investigators  have  adopted  James  Reason’s  classiﬁ-
ation  from  1990,  which  draws  widely  from  the  aviationPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Dhawan  I,  et  al.  Medicatio
Bras  Anestesiol.  2016.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bjane.2015
nd  nuclear  industries  as  well  as  medicine32 in  which  he
lassiﬁed  errors  as  ‘‘slips’’,  ‘‘lapses’’  and  ‘‘mistakes’’.  ‘‘A
lip  results  from  a  failure  in  the  execution  of  an  action,
hether  or  not  the  plan  behind  it  was  adequate  to  reach  its
e
p
b
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bjective’’.32 Slips  are  said  to  be  skill-based,  occurring
uring  the  execution  of  smooth,  automated  and  highly  inte-
rated  tasks  that  do  not  require  conscious  control  or  problem
olving.33 For  example,  writing  the  ‘‘year’’  incorrectly  in
he  date  shortly  after  a  new  year  is  a  slip.21 ‘‘Lapses  involve
emory  failure,  and  may  only  be  apparent  to  the  person
ho  experiences  them’’,32 an  example  being  forgetting  to
dminister  antibiotic  prophylaxis  prior  to  tourniquet  inﬂa-
ion.  Slips  and  lapses  occur  when  actions  do  not  go  as  per
he  plan,  mistakes  happen  when  a  plan  proves  insufﬁcient.
he  operator  is  cognizant  of  the  problem  and  begins  to  use
ules  or  knowledge  to  solve  it.  ‘‘A  mistake  is  likely  to  occur
hen  knowledge  or  rules  are  lacking’’.32 For  example  an
nesthesiologist  was  condemned  of  manslaughter  after  fail-
ng  to  identify  a  disconnected  tracheal  tube  for  a  prolonged
eriod,  until  the  patient  experienced  a  cardiac  arrest  and
nfortunately  perished.21,34
hat  is  a  medication  error?
he  National  Coordinating  Council  for  Medication  Error
eporting  and  Prevention  (NCC  MERP)  deﬁnes  medica-
ion  error  as  ‘‘A  medication  error  is  any  preventable
vent  that  may  cause  or  lead  to  inappropriate  medica-
ion  use  or  patient  harm  while  the  medication  is  in  the
ontrol  of  the  health  care  professional,  patient  or  con-
umer.  Such  events  may  be  related  to  professional  practice,
ealth  care  products,  procedures,  and  systems,  includ-
ng  prescribing;  order  communication;  product  labeling,
ackaging,  and  nomenclature;  compounding;  dispensing;
istribution;  administration;  education;  monitoring;  and
se’’.  The  Council  urges  medication  errors  researchers,
oftware  developers,  and  institutions  to  use  this  standard
eﬁnition  to  identify  errors.
lassiﬁcation
oyen  et  al.35 compiled  a  few  deﬁnitions  in  the  year  2008
Table  2).  On  July  16th,  1996,  NCC  MERP  adopted  a  Medi-
ation  Error  Index  that  classiﬁes  an  error  according  to  the
everity  of  the  outcome  (later  revised  in  Feb  20,  2001).
he  index  considers  factors  such  as  whether  the  error
eached  the  patient  and,  if  the  patient  was  harmed,  to
hat  degree  (Fig.  1).  We  have  simpliﬁed  and  given  a  prac-
ical  classiﬁcation  of  medication  errors  during  anesthesia  in
able  3.  Medication  errors  can  occur  either  during  prepara-
ion,  administration  or  record  keeping.
enesis of error
he  Generic  Error  Modeling  System  distinguishes  failures  in
ecision  making  (mistakes)  from  failures  in  the  implemen-
ation  of  decisions  (action  failures).32 Action  failures,  often
ade  unconsciously,  are  typically  slips  or  lapses.  Thaler  and
unstein  have  presented  a  view  that  places  less  emphasis
n  the  distinction  between  actions  and  decisions,  and  moren  errors  in  anesthesia:  unacceptable  or  unavoidable?  Rev
.09.006
mphasis  on  the  degree  to  which  the  underlying  cognitive
rocesses  are  automatic  or  conscious.36 In  this  view,  rule-
ased  errors  have  much  in  common  with  slips  and  lapses.
egner  has  stressed  the  point  that  conscious  effort  to  avoid
Please  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Dhawan  I,  et  al.  Medicatio
Bras  Anestesiol.  2016.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bjane.2015
ARTICLE IN+ModelBJANE-740; No. of Pages 9
Medication  errors  in  anesthesia  
Table  2  Deﬁnitions  compiled  by  Moyen  et  al.35 in  2008.
Near  miss  The  occurrence  of  an  error  that  did  not
result  in  harm.
Slip A  failure  to  execute  an  action  due  to
routine  behavior  being  misdirected
Lapse  A  failure  to  execute  an  action  due  to
lapse  in  memory  and  a  routine  behavior
being  omitted.
Medical  error The  failure  of  a  planned  action  to  be
completed  as  intended  or  the  use  of  a
wrong  plan  to  achieve  an  aim.
Medication
error
Any error  in  the  medication  process,
whether  there  are  any  adverse
consequences  or  not.
Adverse  drug
event  (ADE)
Any  injury  related  to  the  use  of  a  drug.
Not  all  adverse  drug  events  are  caused
by medical  error  or  vice  versa.
Preventable
ADE
Harm  that  could  have  been  avoided
through  reasonable  planning  or  proper
execution  of  an  action.
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Category l:
Category
Category F:
No error
Error, no harm
Category G:
Category H:
An error occurred that
required intervention
necessary to sustain life
An error occurr
may have cont
to or resulte
temporary harm
patient and re
interventio
An error occurred that may
have contributed to or
resulted in temporary harm
to the patient and required
initial or prolonged
hospitalization
An error occurred that
may have contributed to or
resulted in permanent
patient harm
An error occurred that
may have contributed to
or resulted in the
patient’s death
Figure  1  National  Coordinating  Council  for  Medication
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rror  may,  ironically,  have  the  opposite  effect.37 Taken  col-
ectively,  a  key  message  of  this  substantial  body  of  research
s  that  simply  trying  harder  to  avoid  errors  is  unlikely  to  be
uccessful  on  its  own:  it  is  also  necessary  to  make  processes
nd  systems  safer.38
Cooper  and  colleagues6 have  identiﬁed  several  risk  fac-
ors  in  a  critical  incident  analysis  to  study  preventable
istakes.  Maximum  errors  were  due  to  either  inadequate
xperience  (16%)  or  due  to  inadequate  familiarity  to  equip-
ent  or  device  (9.3%)  whereas  haste  and  inattention  or
arelessness,  each  amounted  to  5.6%  of  errors  during
nesthesia.39 In  the  parallel  world  of  aviation,  speciﬁcally
n  the  ﬂight  deck;  with  very  similar  safety  and  error  issues,
hese  same  trends  are  reﬂected.  The  top  three  causes  in
oth  environments  are  identical;  unfamiliarity  with  situ-
tion,  unfamiliarity  with  equipment  and  failure  to  follow
our  own  prescribed  safety  protocols  (pre-ﬂight  check  versus
achine  check).n  errors  in  anesthesia:  unacceptable  or  unavoidable?  Rev
.09.006
Various  other  factors  exist  in  operating  rooms  giving  rise
o  a  high  incidence  of  medication  errors  during  the  conduc-
ion  of  anesthesia.  Lack  of  staff,  overtime  and  odd  working
ours,  inattention,  poor  communication,  carelessness,  haste
Category A:
Category B:
Category C:
Category D:
 E:
Error, harm
Error, death
ed that
ributed
d in
 to the
quired
n
An error occurred that
reached the patient but did
not cause patient harm
An error occurred that
reached the patient and
required monitoring to
confirm that it resulted in no
harm to the patient and/or
required intervention to
preclude harm
Circumstances or
events that have the
capacity to cause error
An error occurred but
the error did not reach
the patient (an “error 
of omission” does
reach the patient)
 Error  Reporting  and  Prevention  (NCC  MERP,  2001).
 and  Prevention.
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Table  3  Practical  classiﬁcation  of  medication  errors  during
anesthesia.
Errors  during  Errors  observed
Preparation  of
the  drug
Similar  looking  vials/ampoules  placed
together  (misidentiﬁcation  of
ampoules)
Unlabeled  syringes
Not  checking  the  label  (including
expiry  date)  prior  to  administration
Different  concentration  in  the  syringe
and  incorrect  label.  (Incorrect
dilutions  esp.  relevant  in  pediatric
patients).
Administration
of the  drug
Near  misses.
Wrong  patient  identiﬁcation.
Incorrect  dose  (inadequate  or  in
excess)  esp.  in  pediatric  patients.
Different  personnel  for  preparation
and administration  of  drug.
Syringe  swap.
Wrong  route  of  administration.
Incorrect  timing  of  administration.
Omission,  repetition  or  substitution
of drug.
Recording  of
the  drug
delivered
Adverse  event  not  recognized.
Reluctance  amongst  doctors  to  admit
the  error.
Failure  to  report  an  error  during
a
p
i
c
Possible  management  of  erroneous  drug
administration
Training  of  anesthesiologists  begins  with  preparation,  label-
ing  and  arranging  drugs  before  start  of  a  case.  Errors  may
occur  due  to  multiple  reasons;  lack  of  experience,  low
vigilance  (especially  during  maintenance  of  anesthesia),
inappropriate  labeling/identiﬁcation/selection  or  stressful
operation  theater  milieu.  Medication  errors  by  anesthesi-
ologists  in  operation  theater  or  intensive  care  units  can
unfortunately  be  fatal.  Since  these  errors  are  preventable
and  potentially  lethal,  every  attempt  should  be  made  to
reduce  these  errors  in  order  to  provide  safe  anesthesia.
Often  drug  errors  that  occur  cannot  be  reversed.  The  best
way  to  ‘treat’  drug  errors  is  to  prevent  them.  More  than  half
Table  5  Recommendations  by  Jensen  et  al.48
1  The  label  on  any  drug  ampoule  or  syringe  should
be carefully  read  before  a  drug  is  drawn  up  or
injected.
2 Legibility  and  contents  of  labels  on  ampoules  and
syringes  should  be  optimized  according  to  agreed
standards  in  respect  of  some  or  all  of  font,  size,
color  and  the  information  included  (NB,  there
may be  some  disagreement  on  the  detail  of  how
this  should  be  achieved).
3 Syringes  should  be  labeled  (always  or  almost
always).
4 Formal  organization  of  drug  drawers  and
workspace  should  be  used  with  attention  to:
tidiness;  position  of  ampoules  and  syringes;
separation  of  similar  or  dangerous  drugs;  removalmedication.
nd  fatigue  are  the  common  factors  related  to  medical  andPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Dhawan  I,  et  al.  Medication  errors  in  anesthesia:  unacceptable  or  unavoidable?  Rev
Bras  Anestesiol.  2016.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bjane.2015.09.006
aramedical  personnel.19,40--45 Causes  of  medication  admin-
stration  errors  are  tabulated  as  unsafe  acts,  local  workplace
ulture  and  organizational  decisions  in  Table  4.46
Table  4  Causes  of  medication  administration  errors  in
hospitals.46
Category  Causes
Unsafe  acts Slips  and  lapses
Rule/knowledge  based  mistakes
Violations
Others
Local
workplace
factors
Patient
Policies  and  procedures
Ward  based  equipment
Health  and  personality
Training  and  experience
Communication
Interruption  and  distraction
Workload  and  skill  mix
General  work  environment
Medicines  and  supply  storage
Local  working  culture
Supervision  and  social  dynamics
Organizational
decisions
High  level/strategic  decisions.
of dangerous  drugs  from  the  operating  theaters.
5 Labels  should  be  checked  speciﬁcally  with  a
second  person  or  a  device  (such  as  a  bar  code
reader  linked  to  a  computer)  before  a  drug  is
drawn  up  or  administered.
6 Errors  in  intravenous  drug  administration  during
anesthesia  should  be  reported  and  reviewed.
7 Management  of  inventory  should  focus  on
minimizing  the  risk  of  drug  error  (e.g.;  a  drug
safety  ofﬁcer  and/or  a  pharmacist  should  be
appointed  for  the  operating  theaters  and  any
changes  in  presentation  should  be  notiﬁed  ahead
of time).
8 Similar  packaging  and  presentation  of  drugs
contribute  to  error  and  should  be  avoided  where
possible.
9 Drugs  should  be  presented  in  preﬁlled  syringes
(where  possible)  rather  than  ampoules  (either  for
emergency  drugs  or  in  general).
10 Drugs  should  be  drawn  up  and  labeled  by  the
anesthetist  who  will  administer  them.
11 Color  coding  by  class  of  drug  according  to  an
agreed  national  or  international  standard  should
be used  --  of  the  syringe,  part  of  the  syringe,  or  of
the syringe  or  ampoule  labels.
12 Coding  by  syringe  position  or  size  or  by  the  needle
on the  syringe  should  be  used.
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Table  6  Brief  description  of  similarities  and  differences  between  ISO  26825:2008  and  the  Labeling  recommendations.46
ISO  26825:2008  (or
related  standards)
Labeling  recommendations
Clinical  situations  where
labels  should  be  used  in
anesthetic  practice
On  syringes  containing
medications  used  during
anesthesia
All  other  medications  and  all  containers  and  lines
prepared  or  administered  by  anesthesiologists,
including:
Infusions
Injections  for  use  on  the  sterile  ﬁeld
Medications  in  syringes  that  will  accompany  patients
to other  clinical  areas
Lines  and  catheters
Information  required Pre-printed  generic
name  of  medication
Depends  on  label  type.  For  bags,  bottles  and  syringes
label  inclusions  are  as  follows:
Concentration  of  syringe
contents
Patient  name  (given  name  and  family  name)
Patient  Identiﬁer  (ID)
Active  ingredient/s  (medicine/s)  added  to  the  bag  or
syringe
Amount  of  medicine/s  added  (including  units)
Volume  of  ﬂuid  (mL)  --  total  in  bag,  or  syringe
Concentration  (units/mL)
Diluent  (for  syringes)
Date  and  time  prepared
Prepared  by  (signature)
Checked  by  (signature)
Route  of  administration  (where  not  speciﬁed  by
wording  and  color)
Color coding  and
border  indicative  of
medication  class
Route  of  administration
Table  7  APSF  consensus  recommendations  for  improving  medication  safety  in  the  operating  room.49
Standardization High-alert  drugs  (such  as  phenylephrine  and  epinephrine)  should  be  available  in
standardized  concentrations/diluents  prepared  by  pharmacy  in  a  ready-to  use  form
that is  appropriate  for  both  adult  and  pediatric  patients.  Infusions  should  be
delivered  by  an  electronically  controlled  smart  device  containing  a  drug  library.
Ready-to-use  syringes  and  infusions  should  have  standardized  fully  compliant
machine-readable  labels.
Technology Every  anesthetizing  location  should  have  a  mechanism  to  identify  medications  before
drawing  up  or  administering  them  (barcode  reader)  and  a  mechanism  to  provide
feedback,  decision  support,  and  documentation  (automated  information  system).
Additional  ideas.
Pharmacy/preﬁlled/premixed Routine  provider-prepared  medications  should  be  discontinued  whenever  possible.
Clinical pharmacists  should  be  part  of  the  perioperative/operating  room  team.
Standardized  pre-prepared  medication  kits  by  case  type  should  be  used  whenever
possible.
Culture Establish  a  ‘‘just  culture’’  for  reporting  errors  (including  near  misses)  and  discussion
of lessons  learned.
Establish  a  culture  of  education,  understanding,  and  accountability  via  curriculum
and CME.
Establish  a  culture  of  cooperation  and  recognition  of  the  beneﬁts  of  STPC  within  and
s,  prbetween  institutionPlease  cite  this  article  in  press  as:  Dhawan  I,  et  al.  Medicatio
Bras  Anestesiol.  2016.  http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.bjane.2015
of  surveyed  people  believed  that  suspending  doctors  who
have  committed  clinical  errors  is  an  effective  prevention
strategy.47 There  are  various  evidence-based  recommenda-
tions  of  which  a  few  are  quoted  in  Tables  5--7.46,48,49
a
t
lofessional  organizations,  and  accreditation  agencies.n  errors  in  anesthesia:  unacceptable  or  unavoidable?  Rev
.09.006
Pre-printed  peel-off  ﬂag  labels  on  ampoules  and  vials  are
 less  expensive  alternative  to  pre-ﬁlled  syringes  to  facili-
ate  correct  labeling.  The  medication  name  on  user-applied
abels  should  be  matched  to  that  on  the  relevant  ampoule
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r  vial  at  the  time  of  drawing  up  any  medication.  All  lines
nd  catheters  should  be  labeled.  Any  medicine  or  ﬂuid  that
annot  be  identiﬁed  (e.g.,  in  an  unlabelled  syringe  or  other
ontainer)  should  be  considered  unsafe  and  discarded.37
In  the  era  of  robotic  and  more  advanced  surgeries,  it  is
ime  that  anesthesiology  advances  in  engineering  thereby
nhancing  safe  patient  care.  The  envisioned  ﬂuid  delivery
ystem,  named  VEINROM  distinguishes  the  fact  that  prime
ause  of  EDA  is  the  adaptation  of  the  universal  Leur  lock-
ng  mechanism  to  all  prevalent  intravenous  drug  delivery
ystems.  Presently  all  kinds  of  syringe  ports  on  the  ﬂuid
elivery  system  are  able  to  interlock  with  any  syringe  nozzle
y  nature  of  the  inherent  Leur  design,  thus  predisposing  an
dverse  event  to  occur.  VEINROM  proposes  one  syringe  port
or  each  of  the  seven  most  common  drug  categories  used  in
nesthesiology  and  critical  care.50
onclusion
ll  medical  errors  do  not  cause  harm.  No  anesthesiologist
ntentionally  executes  a  mistake,  but  errors  are  unforgiving
s  they  can  cost  a  human  life.  In  an  era  where  patients’
nowledge  and  awareness  about  diseases  and  their  man-
gement  is  increasing,  clinicians  need  to  be  more  vigilant
o  avoid  unfortunate  outcomes  and  medico-legal  claims.  All
fforts  should  be  made  in  reporting  and  prevention  of  medi-
al  drug  errors.
Current  safety  protocols  in  intravenous  drug  delivery
ave  not  changed  over  the  past  60  years.  We  think  it  is  time
o  incorporate  electronic  and  digital  concepts  to  encourage
volution  of  anesthesia-related  drug  delivery  system.
We  infer  that  ‘‘to  err  may  be  human,  but  in  healthcare,
o  err  repeatedly  is  foolish  and  perhaps  criminal’’.
onﬂicts of interest
he  authors  declare  no  conﬂicts  of  interest.
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